The use of vouchers to encourage informed decision making should probably only follow successful cost/benefit analysis performed this way. The idea would be to retain choice while minimizing official sanction. Since the aim of prenatal screening should not be eugenic but simply to maximize choice, the value of the vouchers need only cover the cost of the test itself. In particular, they should not be undervalued to take account of the health service savings from preventing handicap10. Such cheap testing would be a subtle form of coercion.
Vouchers may be seen as an incentive to forgo testing, but the offer of free testing carries the reverse incentive. Vouchers will not overcome all inequity. Choices will be influenced by income, although the effect is small when costs Prenatal screening for congenital disease is controversial. Although it increases choice and may reduce the prevalence of handicap, people are ambivalent about abortion, and the benefits may not always outweigh the side effects': Although it may provide reassurance and let people prepare for bad news, screening also causes miscarriage and anxiety, and medicalizes pregnancy2, 3 . It is difficult for doctors to advise parents. Any screening offer carries some official sanction, the provision of some programmes but not others implies a value judgment by doctors, and current observation suggests that the intent of much state sponsored screening is eugenic rather than choice maximizing". We should help parents decide without prejudgment, but parents cannot consider the opportunity costs of programmes already funded from taxation. We suggest using the price signals of the market, or vouchers, to let parents perform realistic cost/benefit analyses.
INTRODUCTION
Sustained private demand should be the minimum requirement of a screening programme, and new programmes should not be publicly funded until this has been demonstrated-. If the rich are not prepared to pay for something it can hardly be justified to foist it on the poor. Nevertheless, it would be naive to expect that established services such as neural tube defect screening might be withdrawn to measure private demand. Even if the intent was to prevent infliction unwanted screening on compliant populations", it would be difficult to justify the inequity of withholding an established service.
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SCREENING VOUCHERS
If parents were given vouchers, exchangeable either for the test in question or for cash, there would be no inequity. Those who regarded the screening as not worthwhile would still benefit by redeeming the voucher for cash. The results would inform cost/benefit analyses. Correspondence to: Dr J G Thornton are relatively small11 , the usual case for screening tests. It is not the function of the health services to correct disparities in wealth. Society may choose to do this by redistributive taxation but the health services typically strive for equality of provision. Only vouchers achieve this, by preventing those who do not really want the goods offered from subsidizing those who do.
Our system differs from education vouchers12 in that Friedman's vouchers were only redeemable for approved educational services while prenatal diagnosis vouchers would also be redeemable for cash. The reason is that people all agree on the need to educate children and only differ in their opinion about the type of education that is best; the aspect which vouchers allow them~o choose. In contrast, parents regard the type of prenatal screening test as a technical matter for the experts, but disagree on whether to spend resources on prenatal screening at all. Only a cash redeemable voucher permits them to make that choice without coercion.
In summary, if the uptake of a screening service depends on personal choices but there are benefits to others from high acceptance, compliant behaviour is a real risk. Vouchers would strengthen individual decision making and reduce eugenic risks. They are eminently suitable for prenatal screening.
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